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COMMENT
REMEMBERING FINANCIAL CRISES:
THE RISK IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROJECT FINANCE
David J. Park*
Barely a decade ago, a cascading sequence of market failures threatened to 
topple the global financial system. Public responses to the recent Financial 
Crisis were immediate and drastic to resuscitate the global economy while at-
tempting to make the markets safer. Many financial services sectors have 
since recovered to pre-crisis levels. One such industry is project finance, which 
comprises various financing arrangements often used to fund long-term in-
frastructure or industrial projects. Curiously, significant post-crisis banking 
regulations and other global credit enhancement initiatives are pushing 
banks out of project finance and giving rise to institutional investors. This 
Comment argues that animated institutional activity in project finance may 
increase both financial and, more notably, governance risks. Further, in-
creased institutional investment in project finance shifts the risk intended to 
be captured under new banking regulations to unregulated markets and 
makes the financial system more complex and interconnected. Ultimately, 
public responses to the Financial Crisis may have the unintended conse-
quence of increasing project-level risks and injecting seemingly regulated sys-
temic risk back into the global financial system.
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Introduction
In 2013, Paul Tucker, the former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Eng-
land, famously commented, “It will be a while before confidence in the sys-
tem is restored, and never again should confidence be so blind.”1 But others 
are less sure about Tucker’s prediction. They argue that faith in the market 
will be restored in less than a decade,2 pointing to the human tendency to be 
forgetful of financial crises and engage in similar risky behaviors, so-called 
“financial crisis amnesia.”3 Similarly, the former Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System once quipped that “about every 10 
years, we have the biggest crisis in 50 years.”4 Although it has been more 
than a decade since the beginning of the Financial Crisis, we have not yet ex-
perienced a similarly catastrophic event.
The Financial Crisis resulted in losses estimated at more than $500 bil-
lion.5 In its aftermath, many people, even those outside the financial sector, 
lost their jobs and retirement savings.6 A number of financial services came 
1. Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Banking Reform and Macropruden-
tial Regulation: Implications for Banks’ Capital Structure and Credit Conditions, Address at 
the SUERF/Bank of Finland Conference (June 13, 2013), in Banking After Regulatory Re-
forms—Business As Usual? 65, 77 (Esa Jokivuolle & Jouko Vilmunen eds., 2014).
2. Alex J. Pollock, Opinion, Our Financial Crisis Amnesia, Wall Street J. (July 9, 
2014, 6:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/alex-pollock-our-financial-crisis-amnesia-14049
46250 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
3. Tim Geithner, Opinion, Financial Crisis Amnesia, Wall Street J. (Mar. 1, 2012, 
7:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203986604577253272042239982
(on file with the Michigan Law Review).
4. Pollock, supra note 2 (statement of Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve).
5. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Infrastructure Finance—Surviving the Credit 
Crunch 6 (2008) [hereinafter PwC Report], https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/pdf/surviving-the-
credit-crunch.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB5E-JD4K]. For background information about the Fi-
nancial Crisis, see generally Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report (2011) [hereinafter FCIC Report], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/
GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW3U-QXPL].
6. See Mike Rothman, Opinion, Years After Worldwide Financial Crisis, We Can’t Af-
ford to Forget, Hill (Sept. 23, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/352024-years-
after-americas-financial-crash-we-cant-afford-to-forget [https://perma.cc/HM76-6F8W].
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to a screeching halt, including project finance for large infrastructure and 
industrial projects.7 Project finance has been widely used as a funding mech-
anism for various projects, such as constructing Disneyland in Paris and im-
proving and expanding Buenos Aires’s water and sewage services.8 This 
funding mechanism has allowed governments and private companies to
spread the risks and responsibilities of constructing and operating large pro-
jects by creating a legal vehicle to pool investments from private parties.9 Af-
ter the Financial Crisis, this market momentarily contracted.10
The vitality of project finance has been tested repeatedly,11 but the mar-
ket remains resilient and has rebounded since the Financial Crisis.12 Observ-
ers of this phenomenon express great optimism, likely because project lend-
ing has not generally been viewed as inherently risky.13 The recent revival of 
the project finance market, however, is notably different from past recover-
ies. Global regulators and policymakers took drastic measures after the Fi-
nancial Crisis that resulted in the rapid growth of project bonds and institu-
tional investment activity in project finance.14
To demonstrate the negative effects of financial crisis amnesia, this 
Comment discusses the potential ramifications of the increased role of insti-
7. See Jakob Müllner, International Project Finance: Review and Implications for Inter-
national Finance and International Business, 67 Mgmt. Rev. Q. 97, 101 (2017); infra Section 
I.A.
8. John D. Finnerty, Project Financing 399–429 (3d ed. 2013) (describing the Euro 
Disneyland Project and the use of project finance to address various considerations and chal-
lenges of the project); Int’l Fin. Corp., World Bank Grp., The Private Sector and De-
velopment: Five Case Studies 15–21 (1997) (explaining the importance of project finance in 
the Aguas Argentina project).
9. There is no single definition of “project finance,” but it generally “involves the crea-
tion of a legally independent project company financed with equity from one or more sponsor-
ing firms and non-recourse debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset.” Benjamin C. 
Esty, Why Study Large Projects? An Introduction to Research on Project Finance, 10 Eur. Fin. 
Mgmt. 213, 213 (2004). For more information on project finance, see generally Müllner, supra
note 7, at 99–104.
10. See James Leigland & Henry Russell, Another Lost Decade? Effects of the Financial 
Crisis on Project Finance for Infrastructure, Gridlines, June 2009, at 2–4; Vasco Pinto Ferreira, 
Project Finance Recovers, World Fin. (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.worldfinance.com/
banking/investment/project-finance-recovers [https://perma.cc/7YS3-U97A] (“From H1 2008 
the [project finance] market has suffered with restricted access to credit and increased margins 
resulting in a severe decrease in transactions closed and thinner pipeline of deals.”).
11. See infra Section I.A.
12. See Project Fin. Int’l, League Tables 48 (2016) [hereinafter League Tables
2015], http://www.pfie.com/Journals/2016/01/26/c/b/y/PFI-Financial-League-Tables-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RM3N-GMNC] (“In 2015, the global project finance loan market saw vol-
umes reach new highs, up 6.8% at US$277.7bn from last year, when volumes hit US$260bn.”).
13. See, e.g., Moody’s Inv’r Serv., Default and Recovery Rates for Project Fi-
nance Bank Loans, 1983-2015, at 2–4 (2017), http://www.globalinfrafacility.org/sites/gif/files/
Moody%27s-Project%20Finance%20Default%20Study%20%281983-2015%29.pdf [https://perma.
cc/UTW4-KXFW] (finding that recovery rates on defaulted project finance loans between 1983 
and 2015 were around 80%).
14. See infra Part I.
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tutional investors in project finance. Part I introduces the current state of 
project finance and discusses the idiosyncratic growth of the project bond 
market and institutional investment. Part II argues that the rise of institu-
tional investors in project finance may increase financial and governance 
risks at the individual-project level, mostly because of such investors’ active 
involvement in the project bond market. Finally, Part III argues that institu-
tional investors’ elevated role in project finance may correspond to an in-
crease in systemic risks in the global financial system. It contends that insti-
tutional investors encourage migration of risks away from the highly 
regulated banking sector and increase complexity and interconnectedness in 
the financial markets. 
I. The Rise of Institutional Investors in Project Finance
The project bond market developed in the early 1990s following im-
portant changes in federal securities laws.15 Since then, the project finance 
industry has evolved, adapting to new technologies and financial innova-
tions.16 It has expanded and contracted commensurate with debt capital 
market demands and the relative competitiveness of banks in project fi-
nance.17 As the industry continues to fund global infrastructure and energy 
projects, many of the key players have changed as well.18 Commercial banks 
or a syndicate of banks, while still important, are no longer the sole project 
lenders.19 Institutional investors are establishing their stronghold in project 
finance, primarily through project bonds.20 The various institutional partici-
pants of project finance include pension funds, insurance companies, spe-
cialist infrastructure funds, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, and private 
15. See Tom Siebens & David Gasperow, Documentation of Project Bonds, in Interna-
tional Project Finance paras. 9.01, 9.04 (John Dewar ed., 2011); Latham & Watkins LLP,
Client Alert: Why Project Bonds Now? 1–2 (2009) [hereinafter Latham & Watkins Cli-
ent Alert], https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/why-project-bonds-now [https://perma.
cc/ET6L-4XKE] (discussing the development of project bonds as a long-term funding source 
for infrastructure projects). The first use of bonds to finance infrastructure projects in the
United States can be traced back to the 1800s. Siebens & Gasperow, supra, paras. 9.01, 9.04.
16. See Phillip Fletcher, Approaching Legal Issues in a Project Finance Transaction, in
International Project Finance, supra note 15, paras. 1.01–1.05 (describing the “expansion 
of project finance into new industries” and the related legal issues that “have become increas-
ingly complex” and challenging).
17. See Siebens & Gasperow, supra note 15, para. 9.01.
18. See David Carter, The Growing Role of Institutional Investors in Infrastructure Fi-
nance, Financier Worldwide (Jan. 2016), https://www.financierworldwide.com/the-growing
-role-of-institutional-investors-in-infrastructure-finance/ [https://perma.cc/H5MX-9PCB].
19. See id.
20. See Michael Wilkins, Standard & Poor’s: RatingsDirect, Out of the Shad-
ows: The Rise of Alternative Financing in Infrastructure 2 (2013) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) (“In the U.S., about one-quarter of all project lending [in 2012] came 
directly from alternative sources and institutional investors . . . with Europe, Middle East, and 
Africa, along with Asia Pacific, following a similar pattern.”); see also infra Section I.B.
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investment funds.21 These entities are not a unitary class of investors; they do 
not necessarily share the same skill sets or investment strategies with each 
other.22 Importantly, institutional investors have traditionally approached 
project finance differently from banks.23
Project bonds provide an alternative to the traditional debt financing 
method of bank loans.24 These bonds often fund single-asset projects on 
limited recourse or nonrecourse terms.25 There are certain private placement 
restrictions on who can hold project bonds,26 but a wide variety of institu-
tional investors typically invest in project bonds, including pension funds 
and insurance companies.27 The Sections below explore the recent revival of 
the project bond market and the rise of institutional investors in project fi-
nance.
21. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 3; Ass’n. for Fin. Mkt. in Eur. & Int’l Capital Mkt. 
Ass’n, Guide to Infrastructure Financing 27 (2015) [hereinafter AFME & ICMA Guide], 
https://www.afme.eu/globalassets/downloads/publications/afme_guide_to_infrastructure_
financing2.pdf [https://perma.cc/86BC-BCKE].
22. See AFME & ICMA Guide, supra note 21, at 27.
23. See infra Part I. Although banks could be considered “institutional investors” in oth-
er contexts, for purposes of this Comment, the definition precludes banks because their activi-
ties and investment strategies are sufficiently different in project finance. See infra Section I.B. 
Note, however, the distinction between banks and institutional investors is becoming blurred 
in project finance. See infra notes 68–72, 103–105 and accompanying text.
24. Project bonds typically refer to private issuance of notes either through section 4(2) 
of the 1933 Securities Act or Rule 144A or Regulation S. See Robert N. Freedman et al., Prep-
ping for Project Bonds, Law360 (Aug. 28, 2013, 11:54 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
467505/prepping-for-project-bonds (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Section 4(2) 
bonds are “generally offered to a small number of targeted investors who are familiar with the 
project bond market.” Id. In contrast, most cross-border project bonds are issued under Rule 
144A and Regulation S, marketed to a broader group of qualified institutional buyers. Id. In-
vestors of these bonds are generally more passive than those investing in 4(2) private place-
ments, heavily relying on the offering document and expecting that the underwriting banks 
will have performed a due diligence exercise. Id. There are other alternative sources of project 
financing, such as floating rate notes, commercial paper, and funding from export credit agen-
cies and multilateral development banks. John M. Niehuss, International Project Fi-
nance in a Nutshell 195–97 (2d ed. 2015).
25. Tianze Ma, Note, Basel III and the Future of Project Finance Funding, 6 Mich. Bus. 
& Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 109, 109 (2016); Cathleen McLaughlin & Dorina Yessios, Why 
Project Bonds? Why Now?, Latin Law. (May 2011), https://latinlawyer.com/article/1091013/
why-project-bonds-why-now (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
26. See Freedman et al., supra note 24. The SEC requires, among other things, 
(i) investors of private placement securities to meet the requisite degree of qualifications for 
sophistication; (ii) restricted number of investors; (iii) “the absence of any general solicitation 
or advertisement;” (iv) “access . . . to [certain] relevant information concerning the issuer;” and 
(v) “restrictions on resale.” Id.; Mark A. Kantor, Asian Project Finance: Capital Market Offer-
ings Under Rule 144A, E. Asian Executive Rep., Sept. 15, 1994, at 6, 6.
27. See AFME & ICMA Guide, supra note 21, at 27; Ma, supra note 25, at 123–24.
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A. Revival of the Project Bond Market
Historically, global economic conditions and the natural competition 
between the banks and the debt capital market controlled the ebb and flow of 
the demand for project bonds. Bank loans tend to surge when the financial 
markets are liquid and robust,28 and project bond activity increases to fill the 
void when banks are less active.29 For example, the international project 
bond market developed in the 1990s largely because banks were unable to 
meet the global demand for expansive privatization of infrastructure pro-
jects.30 Banks responded by offering commercially competitive, long-term 
project loans after the Asian financial crisis in the early 2000s, which corre-
lated with a brief contraction of the project bond market.31 And before the 
recent Financial Crisis, investors seeking high-yield investments in a global 
liquidity crunch environment were purchasing project bonds in droves.32
The demand for project bonds also tends to surge when the financial 
markets become more knowledgeable about the characteristics and risks as-
sociated with certain projects or regions.33 In the early 1990s, for example, 
the U.S. power market experienced a spike in project bond activity.34 Banks 
previously dominated the U.S. power market, and the project bond market 
hesitated to venture into this unfamiliar market.35 Eventually, project partic-
ipants acquired the requisite knowledge and skills to analyze large power 
projects.36 With increased market confidence in project participants’ ability 
to structure bond offerings in the U.S. power market, investors flocked to-
28. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 194.
29. Cf. Silvio Contessi et al., Bank vs. Bond Financing over the Business Cycle, Econ. 
Synopses, No. 31, Nov. 15, 2013, https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/es/13/
ES_31_2013-11-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ4N-X4TN] (comparing the divergent business 
cycles of bank loans and corporate bonds during economic downturns).
30. See Juliet D’Souza & William L. Megginson, The Financial and Operating Perfor-
mance of Privatized Firms During the 1990s, 54 J. Fin. 1397, 1397 (1998); Mansoor Dailami & 
Danny Leipziger, Infrastructure Project Finance and Capital Flows: A New Perspective, 26 
World Dev. 1283, 1284 (1999); Mansoor Dailami & Robert Hauswald, The Emerging Project 
Bond Market: Covenant Provisions and Credit Spreads 4 (World Bank Pol’y Research, Working 
Paper No. 3095, 2003).
31. See Leigland & Russel, supra note 10, at 1; Latham & Watkins Client Alert, su-
pra note 15, at 2, 4.
32. See Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 2, 4.
33. See Siebens & Gasperow, supra note 15, para. 9.01 (noting that the demand for pro-
ject bonds depends, in part, on “the willingness of the sponsors to undertake the additional 
effort to incorporate a bond offering into a project’s capital structure and the relative difficulty 
of implementing a bond financing at any given stage of a project’s development”).
34. Freedman et al., supra note 24.
35. See id.
36. Id.
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ward the seemingly long-term, safe, and predictable revenue streams of pro-
ject bonds.37
But the Financial Crisis was no ordinary event. Catastrophic market 
failures stymied project lending activities.38 Banks had historically emerged 
triumphant in the project finance market during recessionary periods.39 Af-
ter the Financial Crisis, however, banks approached project lending cau-
tiously. They hesitated to act as sole underwriters and demanded terms un-
favorable to project sponsors.40 Project bonds also became riskier and less 
attractive because certain industries, such as monoline insurance companies, 
were no longer providing important services.41 Many investors lacked the 
appetite to dip into the volatile project bond market. To make matters worse,
governments mired in economic doldrums and hamstrung by fiscal con-
straints stalled public spending on infrastructure projects.42 The need for in-
frastructure and other special projects remained high,43 and in response, 
global regulators and policymakers took extraordinary steps to buoy up the 
project finance market while also curbing risky financial activities.44 Their 
actions ultimately revived the project bond market.45
First, in an attempt to mitigate financial risks identified during the Fi-
nancial Crisis, global regulators46 developed a series of rules that indirectly 
increased the demand for project bonds. Chief among them are the Basel III 
rules, adopted to recalibrate the existing financial regulatory framework and 
37. See id. (finding that project bond activity spikes when there is a critical mass of pro-
jects with “stable creditworthy customers using proven, reliable technology and providing a 
fundamental service”).
38. See Leigland & Russell, supra note 10, at 2–4.
39. See id. at 1–2 (using the Asian financial crisis as an example of banks leveraging the 
market condition and greater bargaining position to obtain favorable lending terms).
40. See PwC Report, supra note 5, at 10. Project sponsors are often equity investors 
who organize a certain project and seek funding for it.
41. See id. at 8. The monoline insurance industry was nearly wiped out after the Finan-
cial Crisis and could no longer provide guarantees or credit enhancements (or “wraps”) that 
would have transformed project bonds into investment grade securities. See id. and infra note 
160 and accompanying text regarding the decline of monoline insurance companies.
42. See PwC Report, supra note 5, at 4.
43. See Richard Dobbs et al., McKinsey Glob. Inst., Infrastructure Productivi-
ty: How to Save $1 Trillion a Year 1 (2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/
Industries/Capital%20Projects%20and%20Infrastructure/Our%20Insights/Infrastructure%20
productivity/MGI%20Infrastructure_Full%20report_Jan%202013.ashx [https://perma.cc/L3BE-
AVXW] (estimating that “$57 trillion in infrastructure investment will be required between 
[2013] and 2030 . . . to keep up with projected global GDP growth,”, which is “nearly 
60 percent more than the $36 trillion spent globally on infrastructure over the past 18 years”).
44. See infra Section I.A.
45. See infra Section I.A.
46. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—a committee of banking supervisory 
authorities created for cooperation of bank supervisory issues—consists of 45 global regulators, 
including central banks and other bank regulators, from 28 jurisdictions. Basel Committee 
Membership, Bank for Int’l Settlements, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm 
[https://perma.cc/APD5-YUBK] (last updated Dec. 30, 2016).
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ensure that the financial markets are better able to withstand future econom-
ic shocks.47 The Basel III rules have had a significant impact on project lend-
ing, namely through the ramping up of Tier 1 capital requirements and the 
introduction of short- and long-term liquidity coverage ratios.48 Although 
these rules are not yet fully implemented,49 many contend that they have re-
sulted in increased bank funding costs, shortened project loan terms, in-
creased assumption of refinancing risk by project sponsors, and reduced 
willingness of banks to provide project-related letters of credit.50 And several 
banks seeking to offload long-term, riskier assets have been selling off exist-
ing project loans.51 U.S. financial regulators widely believe that these rules 
have made the traditional banking sector safer since the Financial Crisis.52
But the rules have also made project bank lending more costly and alterna-
tive sources of funding—such as project bonds—more attractive.53
47. See Ma, supra note 25, at 110–16; Enzo Scannella, Project Finance in the Energy In-
dustry: New Debt-Based Financing Models, Int’l Bus. Res., Feb. 2012, at 83, 88.
48. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 207; Project Bonds: An Alternative Source of Financ-
ing Infrastructure Projects, Deloitte, https://www2.deloitte.com/za/en/pages/finance/articles/
project-bonds-an-alternative-to-financing-infrastructure-projects.html [https://perma.cc/KD
G8-3JG2] (“[T]he implementation of Basel III regulations requires stricter monitoring and 
disclosures, ultimately leading to higher costs and higher capital requirements.”). The rules 
governing Tier 1 Capital (i.e., the highest quality capital a bank must hold against its risk-
weighted assets) were significantly enhanced after the Financial Crisis, accounting for counter-
party credit risk, strengthening the standards for margin and collateral management, and cre-
ating higher capital requirements for over-the-counter derivative instruments. See Accenture,
Basel III Handbook 8 (2011), https://fitc-ng.com/vlearning/fvltest/BCAM%20Demo/story_
content/external_files/Accenture-Basel-III-Handbook1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N68-G7KQ]. 
Basel III also mandates member countries to adopt a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (designed to 
require banks to hold sufficient liquid assets and safeguard them from a financial stress event) 
and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (designed to incentivize banks to fund its activities using more 
stable funding sources). Id. at 9; see also Ma, supra note 25, at 116 (arguing that the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio “are arguably the most significant addition to the 
Basel III framework and are likely to have the most far-reaching impact on global project fi-
nance industry”).
49. See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Bank Capital Requirements (2017), https://
sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Bank_Capital_Requirements_
12192017.pdf [https://perma.cc/K57Z-SSPA].
50. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 207–08; Ma, supra note 25, at 119–20.
51. Regulatory Changes Aim to Plug Capital Hole, Eur. CEO (Oct. 9, 2013), https://
www.europeanceo.com/finance/regulatory-changes-aim-to-plug-capital-hole/ [https://perma.
cc/T5SU-HBT9] (stating that many banks, such RBS and the Bank of Ireland, have sold bun-
dles of project finance debt).
52. See, e.g., Peter Olson & David Wessel, Fed’s Tarullo on Financial Stability: We’re Saf-
er, but Are We Safe Enough?, Brookings (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2015/11/19/feds-tarullo-on-financial-stability-were-safer-but-are-we-safe-enough/
[https://perma.cc/JSJ4-ZXZJ] (summarizing the remarks by then–Federal Reserve Governor 
Daniel Tarullo, who oversaw supervisory and regulatory matters at the Federal Reserve).
53. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 207–08.
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Second, other forms of policymaking and government intervention are 
shoring up the demand for project bonds. Instead of relying on market forc-
es to fill the void in project finance, various governments and international 
organizations have introduced guarantees and other credit enhancement 
programs.54 For example, the European Commission, in conjunction with 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), launched the Europe 2020 Project 
Bond Initiative to incentivize investment in the project bond market for 
large-scale infrastructure projects in various sectors.55 The EIB provides 
credit enhancement of project bonds in lieu of monoline insurance by lend-
ing on a subordinated basis and bearing first-loss liability on a portfolio of 
transactions worth more than 4 billion euros.56 In 2012, the United Kingdom 
piloted a similar initiative, the UK Guarantee Scheme, to spur the project 
bond market and fund infrastructure projects.57
Against this backdrop, project bond issuance has been steadily increas-
ing since the Financial Crisis, both in terms of dollar amount and as a per-
centage of total financing.58 This growth is expected to continue, with many 
practitioners speculating that project bonds may eventually eclipse bank 
loans as the main source of project finance.59 That said, there is little evi-
54. Emma Lindsay, Infrastructure Debt Funds—Still a Lot to Prove, Project Fin., Apr. 
2013. Other than the EU-EIB Project Bond Initiative and the UK Guarantee Scheme, these 
credit enhancement programs include (i) the various export credit agency programs, including 
guarantees and political risk insurance; (ii) the Islamic Development Bank that facilitates Is-
lamic sukuk bond issuance for infrastructure and energy projects; (iii) the World Bank’s Global 
Infrastructure Facility to “help mobilize and leverage funding from institutional investors for 
investment in infrastructure”; and (iv) the Asian Development Bank’s initiative to support 
credit enhancing project bonds seeking to mitigate commercial and political risks. See
Niehuss, supra note 24, at 209–10; Craig Nethercott et al., Introduction to Project Finance 
Report 2 (2017), https://www.lw.com/admin/Upload/Documents/IFLR-PF2017-Full-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NAR7-XM6R].
55. European Inv. Bank, An Outline Guide to Project Bonds Credit Enhance-
ment and the Project Bond Initiative 4 (2012) [hereinafter EIB Guide], http://www.eib.
org/attachments/documents/project_bonds_guide_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XXH-BDPE].
56. Id. at 4–5.
57. UK Nat’l Audit Off., Guarantees Scheme for Infrastructure 7 (2015), 
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/UK-Guarantees-scheme-for-
infrastructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TPN-ZV2V]. Three years later, the United Kingdom 
signed seven guarantees that provided around 40 billion pounds of maximum value of support 
under the Scheme, the longest of which would provide a guarantee for over 40 years. Id. at 4.
58. Sean Johnson et al., White & Case LLP, Unraveling Four Common Myths 
About Project Bonds 4 (2015), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/
download/publications/projectbonds-myths.pdf [https://perma.cc/A85P-X98T] (“The number 
of developments financed through project bonds—and the dollar amounts involved—continue 
to gain traction.”). While the project loan volumes contracted slightly to $236.4 billion in 2016 
from the previous year, project bond issuance increased by $8.3 billion to $43.6 billion. 
Thompson Reuters Project Fin. Int’l, League Tables 50 (2017), http://www.pfie.com/
Journals/2017/01/24/r/x/q/PFILeagueTables2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L4X-K73A].
59. See, e.g., Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 1–2. While the pro-
ject bond market is growing, the trajectory is not linear and consistent. For example, project 
bond issuance dropped by around $15 billion in 2015 from its previous year. League Tables
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dence indicating that project participants suddenly gained the requisite skills 
and knowledge to understand the risks associated with the markets tradi-
tionally dominated by banks.60
B. Increased Role of Institutional Investors in Project Finance
Institutional investors engage in credit intermediation and participate in 
the project finance market primarily through project bonds. Nonbank insti-
tutional investors have increasingly filled the void left by banks’ retreat from 
the project lending market, gradually chipping away at the importance of 
banks in project finance.61 As banks eschew long-term projects, fixed-
income institutional investors seek potentially riskier investments with high 
yields in the current low-interest-rate environment.62 To that end, project 
bonds, which now promise higher returns than corporate and sovereign 
debt, are attractive investments for entities such as pension funds and insur-
ance companies.63 Project bondholders must rely on the “high degree of 
disclosure,” and these bonds are difficult to “renegotiate or restructure 
because they involve so many different ultimate investors.”64 Regardless, 
project bonds offer diversified investment vehicles for various institutional 
2015, supra note 12, at 28. Regardless, the project bond market appears to be growing, accord-
ing to recent data. See Project Fin. Int’l, Introduction to 1H 2017 League Tables 52 (2018), 
http://www.pfie.com/Journals/2017/07/19/m/h/t/PFILeagueMidYearTables2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GR7X-VX77].
60. Cf. Michael Dunning, How the Infrastructure Debt Market Is Evolving to Accommo-
date a Growing Institutional Appetite, InfraNews (Jan. 3, 2013, 12:36 PM) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) (statement of Steve Rankine, Executive Director, Infrastructure Debt at 
Hastings Management Fund) (“[I]t doesn’t make a lot of sense [for institutional investors] to 
have their own project finance teams—it’s too expensive and the analysis in project finance is 
much more complex than corporate deals.”); David Carter, Institutional Investors and Project 
Finance: Problems and Solutions, Norton Rose Fulbright (Mar. 2015), http://www.
nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/127025/institutional-investors-and-project-
finance-problems-and-solutions [https://perma.cc/MN24-MCF8] (describing potential solu-
tions for project bondholders’ lack of project expertise compared to banks, such as appointing 
decisionmakers).
61. See Louise Bowman, Institutional Buyers Jostle for Position in New Infrastructure 
Debt Market, Euromoney (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjwcll
11hcd/institutional-buyers-jostle-for-position-in-new-infrastructure-debt-market (on file with 
the Michigan Law Review); McLaughlin & Yessios, supra note 25 (“Pension funds and life in-
surance companies are increasingly considering investments in projects through capital mar-
kets.”).
62. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 196 (stating that interest rates are generally higher for 
project bonds than other sources of project finance funding); Emil Arca, The Future of Project 
Bonds in Latin America, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 187, 188 (2013).
63. See Bowman, supra note 61; David Oakley & Patrick Jenkins, BlackRock Eyes Infra-
structure Debt Market, Fin. Times (Nov. 25, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/4c9ad99e-
33ed-11e2-9ae7-00144feabdc0 (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (noting that project 
bonds offered around three percentage points higher yield than U.S. Treasury Bonds).
64. Niehuss, supra note 24, at 195–96.
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participants that seek long-term investments and whose passive, “buy-and-
hold” strategy is compatible with the minimal-oversight terms of project 
bonds.65 Accordingly, institutional investment in project bonds grew signifi-
cantly in recent years.66 In fact, institutional investment in even non-
investment-grade project bonds surged, and investors are expected to in-
crease their portfolio exposure to infrastructure transactions.67
Institutional activity in project finance is not limited to project bonds.68
Institutional investors are gradually displacing banks by engaging in certain 
bank-like activities. For example, institutional investors indirectly lend to 
projects by purchasing project bank loans in the secondary debt market.69
Further, certain banks now originate and sell their loans directly to these in-
vestors.70 This allows banks to maintain their origination capabilities while 
keeping long-term liabilities off their balance sheets.71 More notably, institu-
tional investors now lend directly to projects.72 Direct lending, traditionally 
the province of banks, is an increasingly viable and profitable venture for in-
stitutional investors during the construction and operational phases of a pro-
ject.73
Thoughtful government policies can make the financial markets safer, 
more vibrant, and equitable, but policymaking can also have unintended 
65. See id. at 208 (noting that institutional investors, such as insurance companies and 
pension funds, have predictable long-term liabilities); McLaughlin & Yessios, supra note 25;
Marco Sindaco, Standard & Poor’s RatingsDirect, Investing in Infrastructure: Are 
Insurers Ready to Fill the Funding Gap? 4–6 (2014), http://www.biztositasiszemle.hu/
files/201407/sp_investing_in_infrastructure-are_insurers_ready_to_fill_the_funding_gap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E94M-MUAP] (“Life insurers are long-term investors able to hold assets for 
long periods, and typically face less short-term liquidity strains than banks.”).
66. See Ma, supra note 25, at 122–23.
67. See Regulatory Changes Aim to Plug Capital Hole, supra note 51 (noting that institu-
tional investors allocated less than one percent of their resources to infrastructure deals in 
2013, but that this figure is expected to jump to five percent).
68. See Dunning, supra note 60 (“Over time, a great deal of debt will go to the bond 
markets. But they will not be the full solution by any means.”).
69. See Lindsay, supra note 54 (explaining that institutional investors purchased non-
performing project loans at a discount from the Bank of Ireland, Royal Bank of Scotland, Ban-
co Espirito Santo, among others). Institutional investors are purchasing both non-performing, 
distressed project loans and, more recently, more normalized loans from banks. Id.; Dunning, 
supra note 60.
70. See Bowman, supra note 61 (describing the Natixis-Ageas loan purchase arrange-
ment).
71. Id.; Carter, supra note 18.
72. Philip Dawes & Deborah Zurkow, Infrastructure Senior Debt: A Growing Opportuni-
ty, Update, March 2013, at 18, 22, http://www.updatemagazineonline.com/sites/default/files/
downloads/update-2013-1-en-infrastructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG64-Z8GY] (noting that, 
instead of seeking project bonds or loan in the secondary market, institutional investors may 
engage in direct lending “structured to investment grade quality from the outset”); Dunning, 
supra note 60 (statement of Steve Rankine, Executive Director, Infrastructure Debt at Hastings 
Fund Management) (“You are seeing institutions going direct . . . .”).
73. See Dawes & Zurkow, supra note 72; Dunning, supra note 60.
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consequences.74 Public responses to the Financial Crisis (like the Europe 
2020 Project Bond Initiative) were necessary to stimulate funding for global 
infrastructure projects. And rules like Basel III, implemented to prevent fu-
ture economic calamities, arguably made the financial sector safer.75 But no 
meaningful effort has been made to examine the potential risks posed by in-
creased institutional activity in project finance. Before prematurely celebrat-
ing the revival of the project finance market, global financial regulators 
should study the unintended consequences of the various public responses to 
the Financial Crisis.
II. Project-Level Risks
There is a consensus that project finance achieves efficient financial and 
governance structure.76 Project finance presents structural advantages for ef-
ficient allocation of risk, leverage, and value.77 Project bonds, for instance, 
typically offer stable returns at higher rates than similarly structured corpo-
rate or sovereign bonds.78 But research fails to address the recent rise of insti-
tutional activity in project finance. The outdated understanding of the struc-
tural advantages and risks of project finance must be updated. 
This Part focuses on two types of project-level risks: financial and gov-
ernance.79 The rise of institutional investors in project finance and the preva-
lence of project bonds may increase individual projects’ financial risks, de-
spite industry awareness of these risks. The potential impact of higher
74. Cf. Peter J. Wallison, Government Housing Policy and the Financial Crisis, 30 Cato 
J. 397, 399–400 (2010) (arguing that U.S. government’s housing policy “had a profound effect,”
creating incentives that caused the market participants to create and spread financial risk).
75. See Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium: Fostering a Dynamic Global Re-
covery (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.bis.org/review/r170829c.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH2S-
5XJT]. But see Simon Johnson, Picking Up the Slack on Global Banking Rules, N.Y. Times: 
Economix (Sept. 16, 2010 6:00 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/new-
international-banking-rules-fall-short/ [https://perma.cc/JB89-H75G] (arguing that Basel III 
rules have not gone far enough to prevent future financial crises).
76. See Müllner, supra note 7, at 109 (summarizing the project finance literature, which 
presents “clear and consistent evidence of the benefits of [project finance] resulting from agen-
cy cost reduction, higher debt capacity, lower cost of debt, financial distress and optimized tax 
shields”).
77. See generally Salman Shah & Anjan V. Thakor, Optimal Capital Structure and Pro-
ject Financing, 42 J. Econ. Theory 209 (1987).
78. See Carlos Viana et al., Why Project Bonds Are on the Rise in Latin America, Lexol-
ogy (July 28, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=30c0cfc7-e496-4159-b96f-
d77111dc0d3a [https://perma.cc/F5HD-MK2G].
79. For purposes of this Comment, “financial risks” is a broad term that refers to a wide 
range of risks associated with financial transactions, including risks of counterparty default and 
market inefficiencies. Financial risks are distinct from “governance risk,” which refers to the 
potential for project failure due to mismanagement by project sponsors and other project par-
ticipants directly involved in a project.
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institutional activity on governance risk is lesser known. Institutional inves-
tors may increase project governance risks because they tend to undervalue 
governance rights, are less equipped or willing than banks to monitor pro-
jects, and are expanding the already geographically dispersed financial ar-
rangements in project finance.
A. Financial Risk
Institutional investors may increase financial risks for project partici-
pants and individual projects through project bond investment. Project par-
ticipants, privy to the financial risks posed by project bonds, may successful-
ly mitigate exposure to some of these risks. The rapid increase in institution-
institutional activity may nonetheless increase project-level financial risks in 
the aggregate, and newcomers to the market might be unaware of or apathet-
ic to these risks.
Project bonds present inherent financial risks for bondholders and pro-
ject participants. These bonds are often offered in a variety of currencies, ex-
posing them to currency risk if held without appropriate hedging instru-
ments.80 Plus, most public project bonds do not have significant 
requirements for “collateral or security over project assets.”81 This is particu-
larly problematic because project bonds are often issued in regions that have 
“ill-defined or ill-enforced property rights, and bilateral monopoly settings 
(dominant output buyer) that render them vulnerable to opportunistic be-
havior and unilateral contract renegotiation.”82 Accordingly, bondholders 
have limited post-default remedies.
Project bonds also carry certain financial risks for the successful opera-
tion and completion of individual projects.83 These bonds are linked to the 
“great volatility associated with capital markets.”84 This creates a financial 
risk because the demand for project bonds could abruptly diminish, effec-
tively closing the bond window to potential issuers for reasons unrelated to 
projects.85 Also, because project bonds are inexorably linked to sovereign 
credit ratings, a sovereign downgrade could adversely impact an otherwise 
80. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 15, 195; Viana et al., supra note 78.
81. Niehuss, supra note 24, at 195.
82. Dailami & Hauswald, supra note 30, at 5.
83. See generally infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. Project bonds have recently 
been used to finance projects during their construction stage, which was rarely done before. 
Carter, supra note 18.
84. Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 3; see McLaughlin & Yessios, 
supra note 25 (“What looks like a ripe opportunity for a bond issuance one day may be gone 
the next.”).
85. See Mark Plenderleith, Sources of Funding, in International Project Finance,
supra note 15, paras. 3.01, 3.31 (“From time to time, market disruptions have resulted in pro-
ject bond spreads widening and several issues being downgraded, with a number of potential 
bond deals being cancelled or pushed back to the bank market.”).
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healthy project.86 Further, unlike corporate bonds, which are generally issued 
against a company’s credit risk and secured by the company’s various assets 
and cash flows, project bonds are often single-asset limited-recourse or non-
recourse loans with a single source of revenue.87 To make matters worse,
project assets typically have a single function with location specificity, which 
limits their fungibility and flexibility.88 If, for instance, a project’s only source 
of cash flow suddenly dries up or the assets are impaired, a bond issuer may 
experience a sudden liquidity crisis and default on its bonds. 
Institutional investment thus stimulates project bond financing but pos-
es financial risks to project participants and their projects. Well-seasoned 
project participants may mitigate several of these risks,89 and financial mar-
kets continue to find innovative solutions to reduce these risks.90 But the 
rapid increase in institutional activity through project bonds should give the 
markets pause. In the aggregate, significant project bond issuance may still 
increase project-level financial risks, regardless of project participants’ level 
of preparation. This is especially true if rating standards and asset quality de-
cline during prolonged market optimism.91 Moreover, newcomers to project 
finance may disregard these risks, especially if they were solely driven by the 
artificial demands created by regulatory arbitrage and the promise of public 
guarantees.
86. See, e.g., Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades Four Venezuelan Heavy Oil Projects: 
Petrozuata, Cerro Negro, Sincor and Hamaca; Outlook Negative, Moody’s (Jan. 14, 2003), 
https://www.moodys.com/research/MOODYS-DOWNGRADES-FOUR-VENEZUELAN-
HEAVY-OIL-PROJECTS-PETROZUATA-CERRO-NEGRO—PR_63498 (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) (citing, among other things, “the continued strikes and political up-
heaval in Venezuela” and “the downgrade of [Venezuela’s] national oil company” as reasons 
for downgrading the project bonds related to three heavy oil projects in Venezuela).
87. See Dailami & Hauswald, supra note 30, at 5.
88. See id.; Handbook of Key Global Financial Markets, Institutions, and In-
frastructure 537 (Gerard Caprio Jr. et al. eds., 2013) (noting that, for example, “an oil refin-
ery cannot function as a shopping mall”).
89. For example, project bondholders may purchase hedging instruments, such as a cur-
rency swap, or seek certain credit guarantees from international financing institutions to min-
imize their currency risk. Wim Verdouw et al., Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Curren-
cy Risk in Project Finance 2–5 (2015), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/
currency-risk-project-finance-discussion-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS6N-8HH8].
90. Project bondholders and industry participants, for instance, have been exploring 
creative ways to address the “negative carry” problem associated with project bonds. See Tom 
Young, How UK-First Project Bond Solved Negative Carry, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3315510/How-UK-first-project-bond-solved-negative-carry.html
(on file with the Michigan Law Review) (explaining the development of a deferred payment 
mechanism to cure the negative carry problem using the so-called “forward purchase bonds”). 
For more information on negative carry, see generally Plenderleith, supra note 85, at paras. 
3.01, 3.36 and Stefano Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice: Designing, 
Structuring, and Financing Private and Public Projects 256 (2d ed. 2013) (ebook).
91. See infra Section III.B.
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B. Governance Risk
The prevalence of institutional investors in project finance will likely in-
crease governance risk for individual projects. Large infrastructure projects 
already suffer from fragmented self-interest, dilution of accountability, and 
different risk preferences and investment horizons between project partici-
pants.92 Significant institutional activity, especially in the project bond mar-
ket, likely heightens governance risk of individual projects for several rea-
sons. 
First, institutional investors in project finance lack the incentive to exer-
cise their governance rights. Academic research on corporate governance in-
dicates that institutional investors “chronic[ally] undervalu[e]” governance 
rights.93 The most widely accepted explanation for this observation is that 
institutional investors lack the incentive to manage individual companies 
that they control.94 Relatedly, institutional investors operating in project fi-
nance tend to undervalue their governance rights. Their primary interest is 
the certainty of payment from the diverse investment portfolio and the 
matching of incoming and outgoing cash flow.95 Further, there are signifi-
92. See Bent Flyvbjerg et al., Delusion and Deception in Large Infrastructure Projects: 
Two Models for Explaining and Preventing Executive Disaster, Cal. Mgmt. Rev., Winter 2009, 
at 170, 179–80.
93. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 891 
(2013); see also Alicia J. Davis, The Institutional Appetite for “Quack Corporate Governance,”
2015 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 2 (finding that “institutional investors, as a group, generally pre-
fer internal governance mechanisms over external governance mechanisms”); Robert C. Pozen, 
Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 1994. But see Brian 
J. Bushee et al., Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms, 26 J. 
Mgmt. Acct. Res., no. 2, 2014, at 123, 125 (finding that, with certain exceptions, there is little 
evidence supporting any association between the quality of corporate governance and institu-
tional ownership); Kee H. Chung & Hao Zhang, Corporate Governance and Institutional Own-
ership, 46 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 247 (2011) (contending that higher proportions of 
institutional ownership are associated with higher governance quality); Ricky W. Scott, Do In-
stitutional Investors Influence R&D Investment Policy in Firms with High Information Asym-
metry?, 7 Int’l Bus. Res., no. 10, 2014, at 22, 22 (arguing that increased institutional owner-
ship is positively correlated with increased R&D investment, which tends to indicate long-term 
investment objectives).
94. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1317–28 (1991) (finding that the potential costs 
to active governance, borne by institutional investors, are “large [and] immediate,” while the 
expected gains from such governance are “small, deferred, and received by investors”). More 
specifically, (i) the diversified portfolio of institutional investors makes governance interven-
tion of individual companies costly; (ii) institutional investors’ “internal mechanisms for moni-
toring portfolio performance, based on benchmarking or performance relative to peers, cut 
against activist exercise of governance rights”; (iii) devot[ing] internal resources to the activist 
use of governance rights;” and (iv) “evaluation alternatives to benchmarking, based on ‘abso-
lute’ returns, may push portfolio managers even further away from the granular evaluation that 
maps onto firm-specific activism.” Gilson & Gordon, supra note 93, at 891–95.
95. See David Bickerton et al., Launching a Successful Project Bond, Int’l Fin. L. Rev.,
Feb. 1999, at 15, 16.
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cant agency costs associated with mobilizing project bondholders with vari-
ous investment objectives and whose identities are difficult to discern.96 In-
stitutional investors may devalue governance rights precisely because there is 
no need; they might have a knack for identifying safe investments.97 In times 
of inflated market confidence or rampant market abuse, however, institu-
tional investors may not be able to accurately ascertain ex ante the risks asso-
ciated with individual projects. Then, their unwillingness to manage could 
result in a greater number of mismanaged and failed projects.
In fact, institutional investors’ indifference toward governance is making 
risky projects riskier. For example, non-investment-grade projects with sig-
nificant institutional investment tend to lack financial maintenance cove-
nants, which send early warning signals to creditors and bind project spon-
sors with certain economic restrictions.98 Further, unlike banks, which 
typically lend to investment-grade borrowers, a significant number of insti-
tutional investors lend to leveraged, non-investment-grade borrowers.99 This
creates a problem. Institutional investors, which “rely on portfolio diversifi-
cation and liquidity . . . to manage their exposures” often “do not demand 
financial maintenance covenants,” while banks often do.100 This leads to pro-
ject lenders demanding financial maintenance covenant protections from 
investment-grade projects, but not from riskier, non-investment-grade pro-
jects. Therefore, projects that are already deemed unsafe may avoid risk-
mitigation tools that ensure projects are not financially mismanaged, poten-
tially making them even riskier.
In addition, the surge in institutional activity may be diluting the overall 
governance standards of project finance debt instruments. As institutional 
96. See Leng-Fong Lai, Bond’s Return, Int’l Fin. L. Rev., Apr. 2007, at 82, 83. In addi-
tion, institutional project bondholders “may be more numerous and diffuse . . . and may not 
have an active relationship with the project.” Johnson et al., supra note 58, at 1.
97. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 93, at 9–10 (finding that institutional investors tend to 
prefer investing in companies with high-quality internal corporate governance mechanisms 
already in place); Scott, supra note 93, at 33 (finding that institutional investors may have a 
competitive advantage in discerning long-term value of their investments); cf. Kathryn Judge, 
Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 Va. L. Rev. 411, 438 (2017) (arguing that money 
claims issued in the nonbank financial sector are “structured to be sufficiently low-risk and 
short-term that holders need not engage in meaningful due diligence”).
98. See S. Neal McKnight & Presley L. Warner, Introduction: A Great Time to Be a Bor-
rower, to Int’l Fin. L. Rev., Cross-Border Financing Report 1, 2–3 (2017) [hereinafter 
Cross-Border Financing Report], https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/IFLR_
CrossBorder_Financing_Report_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/26CJ-LZYJ]; cf. Johnson et al.,
supra note 58, at 2 (noting that the “covenants for investment-grade project bonds are some-
times actually tighter than those for high-yield project bonds”). For more information about 
financial maintenance covenant, see generally Emeka Chinwuba & Laura Pettinelli, Financial 
Covenants in Project Financing: Key Points, Law360 (July 25, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/947689/financial-covenants-in-project-financing-key-points (on file 
with the Michigan Law Review).
99. Cross-Border Financing Report, supra note 98, at 3.
100. Id.
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investors encroach upon the traditional realms of banking, bank loans and
project bonds are beginning to converge, blurring their structural and pric-
ing distinctions.101 This convergence is “leading to long-term debt capital 
imposing far fewer constraints on borrowers than bank debt has historically”
and diluting the covenant standards altogether.102 Bank loan covenants are 
becoming more structurally similar to those of project bonds, forgoing waiv-
ers and consents.103
Second, banks that are retreating from the project finance market have a 
comparative advantage over institutional investors in project governance. 
For example, bank loans contain terms that are better-suited than alternative 
debt instruments for active project management.104 Bank loans usually con-
tain restrictive covenants for project sponsors, numerous events of default, 
and substantial security over all the project’s assets.105 On the other hand, 
project bonds’ terms are usually more flexible for project sponsors, contain-
ing fewer covenants and limited consent and waiver rights.106 Thus, project 
bonds grant project sponsors significant discretion to manage projects, po-
tentially raising governance concerns. Terms in bank loans are superior to 
those in project bonds because the former allow projects to respond to 
conflicts or changing conditions swiftly.107 Admittedly, the lack of strong 
governance provisions in project bonds or alternative debt instruments does 
not necessarily increase project-governance risk. Bank loans and project 
101. Id. at 2 (“Institutional investor agnosticism between bank loans and bonds, when 
combined with high demand and limited supply, is leading towards an increasing convergence 
of pricing and terms between bank debt and bond debt for many credits.”); Arca, supra note 
62, at 188 (finding that “there are now mixed bank/institutional investor structures where bank 
loans and bonds appear in the same transaction pursuant to common terms or other inter-
creditor arrangements” and that “banks have increasingly become distributors of bonds, and 
funds (usually thought of only as bond buyers) have become investors in some types of bank 
loans”).
102. Cross-Border Financing Report, supra note 98, at 2–3.
103. Id.; Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 4.
104. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 195.
105. See id. Project borrowers often demand “amendments, waivers and consents over 
the life of the loans.” Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 4.
106. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 195; Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 
15, at 4 (finding that project bonds are usually “structured as incurrence covenants, such as 
debt incurrence and restricted payments covenants, that are breached only through intentional 
actions on the part of the borrower and the sponsors”). But see Johnson et al., supra note 58,
at 1–2 (arguing that many project bonds contain some type of proxy mechanism that desig-
nates the responsibility to make certain determinations regarding project management to other 
creditors, technical consultants, or other third-party experts, thereby reducing the need for 
bondholder consent); Freedman et al., supra note 24 (finding that investors in 4(2) private 
placements often take an active role in negotiating the terms of their investment and sign an 
“investor letter” after performing their own due diligence).
107. See Johnson et al., supra note 58, at 1 (finding that project bondholders “may need 
more time to get up to speed on a consent or waiver issue and often charge a fee for consents 
and waivers”).
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bonds, for example, are often pari passu,108 and project bondholders thus 
reap the benefit of more restrictive covenants through a common terms 
agreement, common security agreement, or inter-creditor agreement.109 Ac-
cordingly, project bonds’ less restrictive covenants should not, in theory, 
pose significant governance risk for projects under normal conditions. But 
institutional investors’ growing prominence in project finance may degrade 
overall governance standards of project debt instruments, including bank 
loans,110 and devalue other project participants’ governance rights.
Moreover, institutional project bondholders lack the expertise to moni-
tor projects. Banks, which have operated in project finance for many years, 
have built institutional knowledge to assess project risks and to structure 
loans with project-specific terms.111 To the contrary, institutional investors 
with broad investment portfolios rarely possess the expertise of banks to ac-
tively manage a project—such as the ability to understand various project 
finance ratings and risk analysis and to comply with fiduciary and regulatory 
requirements.112 Therefore, many projects that lack bank financing would 
fail to realize the comparative advantage of banks’ governance expertise. In 
addition, the dominance of project bond financing could render banks, 
which would contribute smaller amounts, to lose important bargaining pow-
er against project sponsors to include restrictive covenants.
The heightened governance risk due to the decreased role of banks’ gov-
ernance expertise and increased institutional activity may especially manifest 
in projects during their construction stage. Despite the lack of expertise and 
incentive to manage projects, institutional investors are exploring innova-
tive, albeit riskier, ways to invest in the earlier stages of projects. Traditional-
ly, project bonds funded “brownfield” projects (i.e., operating projects) and 
were rarely issued to finance “greenfield” projects (i.e., projects in construc-
tion phase) because they were deemed too risky.113 But, with increased insti-
108. In other words, the two instruments receive equal treatment and have same rights 
and obligations. See pari passu, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
109. Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 4. However, banks and project 
bondholders do not always play nice with each other. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. 
Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 Ala. L. Rev. 1037, 1042 
(2008) (noting the “increasingly sophisticated post-default behavior of lenders” against bond-
holders).
110. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.
111. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 194.
112. See id. at 208; Arca, supra note 62, at 190. But some contend that, if bond buyers 
eventually displace bank lenders as the controlling shareholders of the project bond market, “a
corresponding shift in experience could be expected to occur as well.” E.g., id.
113. See Dunning, supra note 60. Project bonds were often used in operating projects to 
refinance bank loans nearing maturity and fund expansions, capital expenditures, and other 
operating activities, but not usually to take on construction risks. See id.; Niehuss, supra note 
24, at 195; see also Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 2–3 (arguing that pro-
ject bond issuance was rarely used in financing constructions “because it was considered diffi-
cult to structure bonds with the flexibility needed to fund the construction phase of a project 
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tutional activity, projects bonds are more frequently used to finance green-
field projects.114 Industry experts are sanguine about this recent trend.115 In-
stitutional investors, they argue, could “become more sophisticated in un-
derstanding and pricing construction risk” and more “willing to assume 
construction risk, with or without completion guarantees, in return for ap-
propriate pricing.”116
Projects in their construction phase, however, have not become more 
secure investments. The main difference now is that the traditional sources 
of greenfield project funding (i.e., bank loans) have dried up, and there is a 
greater need for alternative sources of funding such as project bonds.117
Meanwhile, institutional investors still lack the requisite expertise to oversee 
greenfield projects.118 Swift communication channels and continued coordi-
nation among the debt providers and project sponsors are particularly par-
amount during a project’s construction stage.119 But mobilizing institutional 
investors to quickly respond to the projects’ changing needs may be imprac-
tical and costly.120 If institutional project bondholders are less willing to bar-
gain with project sponsors over contract terms and oversee the construction 
of a project through completion, the project’s construction risk will likely in-
crease.
and because the project bond market was thought to have limited appetite for construction 
risk”).
114. See Toni Baini, Using Project Bonds to Finance Construction Risk, Latin Fin., Jan. 
17, 2018, http://www.latinfinance.com/magazine/2018/january-february-2018/using-project-
bonds-to-finance-construction-risk (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Latham & Wat-
kins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 3 (listing RasGas Company Limited, Nakilat Inc., and 
several power projects in the United States. as examples of project bond issuance for greenfield 
projects). But see Dunning, supra note 60 (arguing that only “a small number” of institutional 
investors “have an appetite for greenfield and construction risk, and the associated higher re-
turns” despite the huge costs of construction risks and delay, while most others “focus on refi-
nancing existing assets, or financing acquisitions by infrastructure funds”). Many of these 
bonds were backed by completion guarantees or other forms of completion support (such as 
“turnkey” engineering, which places construction risks on the contractors) to protect bond-
holders. Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 3.
115. See, e.g., Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 15, at 3.
116. Id.
117. See supra Part I.
118. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
119. Cf. Anita Ceric, Communication Risk in Construction Projects: Application of Princi-
pal-Agent Theory, 4 Org. Tech. & Mgmt. Construction 522, 522, 524–26 (2012) (“In con-
struction projects, the principal–agent problem is even more pronounced than is usually the 
case because of their short-term employment relationship.”). See generally John Dewar & Oli-
ver Irwin, Project Risks, in International Project Finance, supra note 15 (discussing the 
importance of timely construction and the ramifications of delays).
120. Cf. McLaughlin & Yessios, supra note 25 (finding that project bonds make any re-
quest for an amendment or a waiver difficult to coordinate because “[bond] issuer cannot con-
tact bondholders individually for support” and “as more passive investors, many bondholders 
take less interest than banks in amendments and waivers”).
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Third, increased institutional project bond activity expands among pro-
ject participants the already-dispersed financial arrangements, which likely 
increases governance risks. Research indicates that wide geographic distance 
between investors stymies the formation and internal functioning of enter-
prises.121 Wide geographic distance has some benefits in the project finance 
context, such as mitigating political risks (e.g., host government opportun-
ism) or eliminating certain limitations and risks of cross-border bank lend-
ing.122 Several scholars, however, contend that greater geographic distance 
between corporate partners is associated with information asymmetry, diffi-
culty in forming mutual alliances, and inefficient allocation of assets.123 And 
projects in greater-risk regions tend to encourage more geographically dis-
tant partnerships.124 This means that projects already associated with signifi-
cant risks will likely use debt instruments such as project bonds to disperse 
the creditor base further. Greater geographic distance between project 
121. See generally Roberto Ragozzino & Jeffrey J. Reuer, Geographic Distance and Corpo-
rate Acquisitions: Signals from IPO Firms, 32 Strategic Mgmt. J. 876, 888 (2011) (finding that 
geographically distant companies are less likely to be acquired without certain factors, such as 
venture capitalist backing and the reputation of the target’s lead underwriter). Note that these 
two studies focused on the equity side (i.e., not the debtor side) of investments, and the find-
ings thus might not have direct relevance to project bond financing; Jeffrey J. Reuer & Nandini 
Lahiri, Searching for Alliance Partners: Effects of Geographic Distance on the Formation of R&D 
Collaborations, 25 Org. Sci. 283 (2014) (discussing the chilling effect of geographic distance 
on collaborations).
122. See, e.g., Sinziana Dorobantu & Jakob Müllner, Debt-Side Governance and the Geog-
raphy of Project Finance Syndicates, J. Corp. Fin. (forthcoming Dec. 2018) (manuscript at 2) 
(on file with the Michigan Law Review) (finding that projects with large cross-border creditor 
base may mitigate political risks or prevent host governments from engaging in opportunistic 
behavior by “pool[ing] non-redundant sources of political, social and economic leverage” and 
“leverag[ing] the implicit coercive power of lending markets and the threat of withdrawing 
future funding if opportunistic behavior occurs”).
123. See generally Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Home Bias at Home: Local 
Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios, 54 J. Fin. 2045 (1999) (finding that investors generally 
prefer to make geographically proximate investments due to information asymmetry between 
local and non-local investors); Dorobantu & Müllner, supra note 122 (finding that 
“[g]eographically proximate banks are more likely to share common cultures, legal frame-
works, loan portfolios and stakeholders”); Ranjay Gulati, Social Structure and Alliance For-
mation Patterns: A Longitudinal Analysis, 40 Admin. Sci. Q. 619, 637, 642 (1995) (concluding 
that geographically less-distant firms tend to have more commonalities and are more likely to 
seek alliances); Atif Mian, Distance Constraints: The Limits of Foreign Lending in Poor Econo-
mies, 61 J. Fin. 1465 (2006) (noting that cultural and geographical distance impedes multina-
tional banks’ cross-border lending, including the ability to bilaterally renegotiate and success-
fully recover from defaults). But see Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, Does Distance 
Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending, 57 J. Fin. 2533, 2535, 2566 
(2002) (arguing—before the Financial Crisis—that information asymmetry linked to geograph-
ic distance is overstated and financial institutions have engaged in more distant lending “with-
out making poorer decisions”).
124. See Dorobantu & Müllner, supra note 122, at 2–3. The authors, however, argue that 
this is due to the ability of geographically dispersed partnerships’ ability to mitigate high local
risks. Id. at 7–9.
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participants may thus hamper the proper operation of these high-risk pro-
jects.
In sum, despite the optimism shared by many scholars,125 modern pro-
jects with significant institutional investment do not necessarily provide op-
timal structure for managing financial and governance risks. A sudden rush 
of neophytes into the project finance market could increase project-level fi-
nancial risks. Institutional investors, which are often geographically dis-
persed, lack proper incentives and tools to actively manage projects. Accord-
ingly, significant institutional investment might render a project more likely 
to fail. Certain specialized institutional investors have recently emerged with 
the “depth of experience necessary” to understand project risks and actively 
manage projects internally, and many more may follow suit.126 Nonetheless, 
most institutional investors, especially newcomers, are unlikely to have the 
skills and experience to manage immensely complicated projects.127 Of 
course, risk management can be outsourced to specialized firms, but, as illus-
trated in Part III, this could make the global financial system riskier as a 
whole. 
III. Systemic Risk in the Global Financial System
The Financial Crisis wreaked havoc not only on the financial markets 
but on all participants in the global economy.128 In the aftermath, global fi-
nancial regulators agreed that it was necessary to view financial risks from a 
new perspective.129 Instead of just addressing risks at individual-company or 
financial-sector levels, they developed the so-called macroprudential frame-
work to examine systemic risk across financial markets.130 Global financial
regulators carefully studied the Financial Crisis and determined that, among 
125. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
126. Carter, supra note 18, at 52.
127. See Arca, supra note 62, at 188 (noting that large projects formed by a syndicate of 
banks already have a large number of participants to coordinate); Dunning, supra note 60.
128. See FCIC Report, supra note 5, at 389–401.
129. See Claudio Borio, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Implementing a Macropru-
dential Framework 1–4 (2010), https://www.bis.org/repofficepubl/hkimr201007.12c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JXK9-MTNP].
130. See id. at 3; Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial 
Regulation, 88 Ind. L.J. 1405, 1459–60 (2013); Douglas J. Elliott et al., The History of Cyclical 
Macroprudential Policy in the United States 6 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser. 
No. 2013-29, 2013). While macroprudential regulatory tools apply to specific institutions and 
types of market actions, they apply to “all relevant institutions and activities on the basis of 
macro indicators, regardless of whether a specific institution or activity would independently 
warrant application of the tool.” Working Grp. on Macroprudential Policy, Grp. of 
Thirty, Enhancing Financial Stability and Resilience 42 (2010), http://group30.org/
images/uploads/publications/G30_EnhancingFinancialStabilityResilience.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N2EX-6TN4].
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other things, weak financial regulation, complexity, and interconnectedness 
of the financial markets contributed to the catastrophic event.131
More than a decade after the global financial meltdown, academics and 
regulators are still surveying the markets for another financial crisis. One ar-
ea that received little attention regarding its systemic risk potential is project 
finance. There are characteristics of project finance—and project bonds in 
particular—that render certain systemic risk considerations inapplicable. For 
example, project bonds likely pose low risk of fire sale, or a bank-like 
“run,”132 because of certain restrictions on resale and their long-term ten-
or.133 In addition, project bond issuance does not generate the same type of 
complexity or interconnectedness created by money market mutual funds’
multiple layers of conduits and structures before the Financial Crisis.134
Nevertheless, the recent rise of institutional investment in project fi-
nance necessitates a closer look on an already risky and complex financial 
industry. This Part examines the macro-level, systemic risk implications of 
the proliferation of project bonds and increased institutional activity in pro-
ject finance. It contends that the prominence of institutional investors in 
project finance shifts financial risks away from the well-regulated banking 
sector, undermines the existing regulatory framework, and encourages mar-
ket participants to engage in regulatory avoidance. Institutional investors 
may render financial markets more complex and interconnected by resusci-
tating certain risky industries such as monoline insurance companies. Much 
like the residential mortgage securitization market leading up to the Finan-
cial Crisis, institutional investors are causing the project finance industry to 
become specialized and decentralized.
A. Migration of Risks Outside of the Banking System
The entrenchment of institutional investors in project finance likely in-
creases systemic risk in the markets. Various institutional participants con-
131. See Verdier, supra note 130, at 1460 (contending that “high leverage, widespread 
liquidity vulnerabilities, lack of transparency of positions, inadequate risk analysis, and inter-
connected exposures among market participants” contributed to the Financial Crisis).
132. A fire sale or a bank-like “run” occurs when deposit-substitute lenders attempt to 
exit the market at once, causing haircuts and catastrophic knock-on effects to the wider finan-
cial markets. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo. L.J. 193, 199–201 (2008) (defining 
“bank run” as “the inability of a bank to satisfy withdrawal-demands causes its failure, in turn 
causing other banks or their creditors to fail”).
133. See Freedman et al., supra note 24; cf. Judge, supra note 97, at 475 (explaining that 
the short-tenors of other instruments makes sub-optimal behavior easy). But see Müllner, su-
pra note 7, at 113 (finding that “all partners seek to reduce their sunk costs at the same time”
when expectations of projects are not met, which can lead to “extensive cost overruns, con-
struction delays and excessive legal costs”). Bondholders that are permitted to transfer bond 
ownership must, among other things, comply with the SEC’s registration or exemption re-
quirements. Freedman et al, supra note 24.
134. Cf. Judge, supra note 97, at 441–43.
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tinue to displace banks in the project finance market through project bonds 
and other complex financial instruments.135 The growing institutional activi-
ty has been spurred, in part, by active government credit enhancements,136
but it is also motivated by growing regulatory costs and burdens in the bank-
ing sector.137
Institutional investors persistently engage in risky project finance trans-
actions. Although some praise the elevated role of these investors in project 
finance,138 there are reasons to be wary of their role. For one, certain institu-
tional project participants have short-term profit motives.139 More im-
portantly, institutional investors often encourage market participants to en-
gage in risky, highly leveraged transactions.140 This is evident in the 
unrelenting institutional project investment activity during recent high-risk 
periods. Even in the current historically low-commodity-price environment, 
institutional investors remain a viable financing option.141 They continue to 
identify alternative financing methods—such as royalty- or production-
based payments, sale-leaseback transactions, and convertible debt and debt-
equity swaps—to invest in projects with high financial and political risks.142
The risks associated with project finance remain high, but investors are 
shifting away from the highly regulated banking industry to escape onerous 
rules and requirements. For example, increased institutional activity in pro-
ject finance undermines countercyclical regulation,143 implemented to pre-
vent future financial disasters. Shortly after the Financial Crisis, global regu-
135. See supra Section I.B.
136. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
138. Partnering for More Efficient Financing, Trade Fin., July 17, 2013 (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) (contending that “more sources of funding, means more competition, 
more partnership, and therefore more efficient financing”).
139. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance,
37 J. Corp. L. 265, 296, 302–06 (2012) (explaining the institutional investors’ tendency to make 
decisions without considering an action’s effects on the company’s long-term value).
140. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1, 7–9 (1987) (arguing that the rise of institutional investors has led to highly leveraged 
corporate takeover activities aimed at achieving short-term gains).
141. See Sergio J. Galvis & Inosi M. Nyatta, Alternative Financing of LATAM Projects,
Proj. Fin. Int’l, May 2016, at 54, https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/ProjectFinance
International_May2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX2X-ECYZ].
142. Id. (finding that actual and projected cashflows for projects in a variety of stages of 
development have declined due to the prolonged decline in commodity prices, making project 
finance a risky venture in the current environment).
143. Countercyclical regulation is a new regulatory approach designed to address (i) “the 
boom-and-bust nature of the credit cycle,” (ii) the tendency of financial regulation to “recede[] 
as the credit cycle heats up and overcorrect[] when lending contracts,” and (iii) “financial regu-
lators’ perennial aversion to intervention in financial markets in flush economic times.” See
Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 1181, 1184–
93 (2015).
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lators realized that the then-existing regulatory framework was procyclical,144
making the financial system vulnerable to shocks and knock-on effects.145
Accordingly, global regulators introduced a “countercyclical buffer” that al-
lows national authorities, at their discretion, to require certain banks to re-
tain additional capital in times of excess capital growth.146 This requirement, 
however, only applies to certain large bank holding companies.147 As more 
project lending shifts from the banking sector to institutional investors, the 
risks associated with institutional lending will escape countercyclical regula-
tion.148
Further, institutional investors are encouraging other project partici-
pants to engage in regulatory avoidance. For example, institutional investors 
and banks recently began using a risk-pooling and risk-shifting financial in-
144. See id. at 1184–85 (stating that regulatory grip tends to ease during market expan-
sions but tighten after catastrophic financial events). Historically, regulators’ aversion to inter-
vening during market expansionary periods had contributed to financial crises. See Basel 
Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Strengthening the Re-
silience of the Banking Sector 41 (2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K7BL-4KBY].
145. In a procyclical financial market, losses in any financial sector could spark a vicious 
cycle of destabilization, whereby problems in the financial system contribute to a downturn in 
the real economy. See McCoy, supra note 143, at 1184.
146. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel 
III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems 
55, 57–58 (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q745-XPDL] (dis-
cussing the option of imposing an additional 2.5% buffer of the risk-weighted assets). Among 
other things, global regulators attempted (i) to rectify the “boom-and-bust nature” of the credit 
cycle (or the potential for the credit market to create asset bubbles and bursts) and (ii) to re-
verse the procyclical nature of financial regulation. McCoy, supra note 143, at 1183–84. The 
countercyclical buffer operates as a limit on asset overvaluation during economic expansion 
and additional loss absorbing capacity during economic downturns. Michael S. Barr et al.,
Financial Regulation: Law and Policy 318–19 (2016). To learn more about the countercy-
clical buffer, see generally Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB), Bank for Int’l Settle-
ments (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ccyb/ [https://perma.cc/4GT4-GYAX].
147. See Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Policy Statement Detailing Framework for 
Setting Contercyclical Capital Buffer, Board Governors Fed. Res. Sys. (Sept. 8, 2016, 4:00 
PM), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20160908b.htm [https://
perma.cc/2HPS-DCK2] (stating that the U.S. countercyclical buffer requirement applies only 
to “advanced approaches” banks, “generally those with more than $250 billion in assets or $10 
billion in on-balance-sheet foreign exposures, and to any depository institution subsidiary of 
such banking organizations”).
148. Cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an An-
alytical Framework, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1349, 1351–52 (2011) (explaining that institu-
tional investors’ system-wide correlation may increase procyclicality of market risk and trans-
form local project failures into a broader systemic market failure). But see Contessi et al., supra
note 29, at 2 (stating that “bank loans behaved in a markedly procyclical manner (with a lag) 
during the recent financial crisis, while [corporate] bond markets did not”).
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strument called “synthetic securitization” in project finance.149 In such a
transaction, there is no sale or transfer of assets; banks merely transfer the 
tranched risk exposure to institutional investors, generally using credit de-
fault swaps, credit guarantees, or other derivatives contracts.150 Synthetic se-
curitization thus allows banks “to transfer credit and other default risks with 
respect to illiquid assets held on their balance sheets, improve their capital 
ratios and thereby free up regulatory capital to be used for additional lend-
ing.”151 The financial markets routinely seek innovative ways to navigate the 
existing regulatory regime, and institutional investors may encourage com-
plex transactions that allow market participants to cut corners in project fi-
nance.
B. Complexity and Interconnectedness
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, global financial regulators and 
policymakers realized that one reason the Financial Crisis was difficult to 
contain was the complexity and interconnectedness of the financial mar-
kets.152 Project finance is already complicated and interconnected. Interna-
tional projects often involve a panoply of participants, including nonfinan-
cial institutions (e.g., construction and development companies) and global 
development banks.153 Coordinating between the various project partici-
pants, which possess diffuse incentives and rights, is difficult.154 Moreover, 
the web of financial instruments used in project finance is inexorably linked 
149. See, e.g., Stephen Foley, Opinion, A Synthetic Path to Green Lending that Might Just 
Work, Fin. Times (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/7042b704-fad1-11e6-bd4e-
68d53499ed71 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
150. Daniel N. Budofsky, A Resurgence of Synthetic Securitizations, Pillsbury Win-
throp Shaw Pittman LLP (June 20, 2017), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-
insights/a-resurgence-of-synthetic-securitizations.html [https://perma.cc/EY99-SVMM].
151. Id.; see also Foley, supra note 149 (“Because the bank has reduced its potential expo-
sure to defaults on the securitised loans, they can be treated by regulators as less risky assets, 
and less capital has to be set aside to cover losses. The freed-up capital can be redeployed to 
back a further round of lending.”). While the use of synthetic securitizations in project finance 
is heralded as a positive development, the overall market implications of this risk avoidance are 
unclear. See id. (discussing the potential for synthetic securitization as a financial innovation 
that could encourage environmentally-friendly lending practices by banks in the future).
152. Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s Eye View: The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Causes 
and Remedies, in Restoring Financial Stability 1–25 (Viral V. Charya & Matthew Richard-
son eds., 2009).
153. See Müllner, supra note 7, at 100; Latham & Watkins Client Alert, supra note 
15, at 2–3.
154. See generally L.M. Farrell, Principal-Agency Risk in Project Finance, 21 Int’l J. Pro-
ject Mgmt. 547 (2003) (explaining the heightened principal-agency problem in project fi-
nance compared to traditional asset-based financing); Emmanouil Gkeredakis, The Constitu-
tive Role of Conventions in Accomplishing Coordination: Insights from a Complex Contract 
Award Project, 35 Org. Stud. 1473 (2014) (discussing inter-partner complexities among pro-
ject participants).
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to the local and global economy.155 Unfortunately, increased institutional ac-
tivity in project finance may further complicate the industry and interweave 
a far broader group of market participants. While bank project lending also 
often involves complex financial instruments,156 the rise of institutional in-
vestors in project finance is likely increasing the financial markets’ complexi-
ty and interconnectedness in at least two ways. 
First, increased institutional activity in project finance may be reviving 
certain complex and risky industries and financial instruments. One such 
industry is monoline insurance. Before the Financial Crisis, project bond-
holders heavily relied on monoline insurance companies to provide financial 
guarantees (or “wraps”) on projects’ principal and interest payments if the 
project bond issuers defaulted on those payments.157 Due to its risk exposure 
to the U.S. housing market before the Financial Crisis, the monoline insur-
ance industry contracted drastically, facing near-extinction.158 Nonetheless, 
over the last several years, monoline insurance companies have slowly begun 
to revive and reenter the project finance market.159
The financial markets will likely become more complex if increased in-
stitutional activity fully revives the monoline insurance industry. Since its 
155. For example, the $2.3 trillion financial guarantees and credit enhancement of pro-
ject bonds are “highly connected to the real economy and to the major banks that have large 
exposures to the [monoline insurance companies].” Geneva Ass’n Systemic Risk Working 
Grp., Systemic Rick in Insurance 59 (2010) [hereinafter Geneva Ass’n Report], https://
www.genevaassociation.org/sites/default/files/research-topics-document-type/pdf_public/
ga2010-systemic_risk_in_insurance_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6NC-93NQ].
156. See Niehuss, supra note 24, at 194 (noting that banks also often use hedging in-
struments in project finance to offset interest rate risks, which increases transaction costs and 
raises counterparty risks).
157. See EIB Guide, supra note 55, at 4, 8; Geneva Ass’n Report, supra note 155, at 18.
158. See EIB Guide, supra note 55, at 4 (finding that “monoline insurers (who previously 
guaranteed bonds issued by project companies) have become significantly less active”); And 
Then There Was One: The Bond-Insurance Industry Struggles for Survival, Economist (Nov. 4, 
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17420088 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
The vast majority of monoline insurers were downgraded from their AAA status and were 
forced to exit the project finance market. PwC Report, supra note 5, at 8; Agustino Fontevec-
chia, Left Overs of the Financial Crisis: Last Monoline to Lose AAA-Rating, Forbes (Oct. 25, 
2010, 8:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2010/10/25/left-overs-of-the-
financial-crisis-last-monoline-to-lose-aaa-rating/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
159. Gill Plimmer & Robin Wigglesworth, Monoline Revival Could Aid Infrastructure,
Fin. Times (July 22, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/9790c5c2-d27b-11e1-8700-
00144feabdc0 (on file with the Michigan Law Review); see also Oliver Renick & Maria Bonello, 
Bond Insurance Then & Now: The Revival of an Industry, Bond Buyer (Apr. 30, 2014, 6:16 
PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/123_83/bond-insurance-then-and-now-revival-of-
industry-1062071-1.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“With freshly upgraded rat-
ings on Assured Guaranty and MBIA-owned National Public Finance Guarantee, the bond 
insurers are hoping rising interest rates will push more state and local governments this year to 
consider the savings that come with piggybacking on an insurer’s rating.”).
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inception, monoline insurance was deemed riskier than other types.160 In 
fact, it “played a substantial role in the Financial Crisis” by spiking investor 
demand in the U.S. housing market.161 No federal regulator in the United 
States oversees these financial-guarantee insurers; monoline insurers are 
regulated at the state level.162 Many contend that state-based insurance regu-
lation fails to address “the regulatory demands of a national, and increasing-
ly global, insurance market” and creates inconsistencies in enforcement and 
supervision.163 So a U.S. regulatory regime that treats monoline insurance 
companies differently from other institutions that provide functionally simi-
lar products complicates regulatory efforts to monitor and mitigate the risks 
associated with monoline insurance.
Second, growing institutional activity through project bonds and other 
financial instruments may lead to specialization and decentralization of the 
industry. Project bonds, for instance, allow a wide variety of institutions and 
sophisticated investors to take a debt interest in risky projects.164 And project 
bondholders do not necessarily force out other conventional project finance 
160. Dwight M. Jaffee, Monoline Regulations to Control the Systemic Risk Created by In-
vestment Banks and GSEs, 9 B.E. J. Econ. Analysis & Pol’y no. 17, 2009, at 10–11; see also 
Subcomm. on Fin. Guarantee Instrumentation of the Comm. on Devs. in Bus. Fin., NAIC 
Model Act on Financial Guaranty Insurance: A Commentary, 43 Bus. Law. 717, 718 (1988) 
(explaining how monoline insurers are regulated with greater scrutiny than multiline insurers). 
Monoline insurers are generally highly concentrated, highly leveraged, and highly sensitive to 
credit ratings. Geneva Ass’n Report, supra note 155, at 18, 60.
161. See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1569, 1586–87 (2014) (explaining the risks associated with financial-guarantee 
insurance and the monoline companies’ role in increasing the investor demand for residential 
mortgage-backed securities). But see Scott E. Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, 
and the Future of Insurance Regulation, 76 J. Risk & Ins. 785, 788–89 (2009) (stating that cer-
tain regulatory requirements limited monoline insurance companies’ role in the Financial Cri-
sis).
162. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 161, at 1578–93 (noting that post–Financial 
Crisis “reforms of insurance law and regulation [left] the state-based system of insurance regu-
lation essentially unchanged for all but the small number of insurance-focused financial 
firms”).
163. See Fed. Ins. Office U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, How to Modernize and Im-
prove the System of Insurance Regulation in the United States 1, 23–45 (2013), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/Documents/How%20to%20Modernize%20and%20
Improve%20the%20System%20of%20Insurance%20Regulation%20in%20the%20US.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2A2L-63GY]. Insurance companies are subject to some level of asset adequa-
cy analysis, including liquidity management, by state regulators generally at the individual-
entity level, and their financial holdings are limited to “relatively conservative investments.”
Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Insurance Law & Policy 16 (4th ed. 2017); Geneva Ass’n 
Report, supra note 155, at 68. In addition, the insurance industry, with the exception of large 
insurance companies with significant non-core-insurance investments, such as credit default 
swaps, weathered the Financial Crisis relatively better than large bank holding companies. 
Baker & Logue, supra, at 16. But it was precisely the non-core-insurance activities that in-
creased systemic risk leading up to the Financial Crisis. See Geneva Ass’n Report, supra note 
155, at 3, 33–63 (concluding, in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, that “only two non-core 
[insurance] activities have the potential to be systemically relevant”)
164. See supra Part I.
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market participants from co-investing with the bondholders.165 Modern in-
ternational projects with significant bond financing thus comprise a wide 
variety of project participants. Institutional investors in project finance 
might suggest that such broadening of the investor base makes the markets 
safer. Specialization of function, diversification, and allocation of risks to a 
broader base of investors, they would argue, defrays financial losses among 
many smaller financial institutions, thereby reducing the probability of mar-
ket-wide failures and addressing the “too-big-to-fail” problem.166 But the 
market efficiencies created by specialization and decentralization have dire 
consequences, especially during excessive credit growth and unbridled mar-
ket optimism.167
The role that securitization,168 especially of residential mortgage loans, 
played in the Financial Crisis illustrates the perils of specialization and de-
centralization of financial sectors. Securitization is a financial innovation 
that weaves together several gatekeepers, “including underwriters, [credit] 
rating agencies, bond insurers, lawyers, accountants, and so on.”169 Each 
gatekeeper and market participant has a specialized role. Driven by the many 
benefits of securitization,170 the residential mortgage securitization market 
grew exponentially just before the Financial Crisis.171 In fact, banks similarly 
used securitization in the project finance market, which contributed to the 
tremendous growth of the market before the Financial Crisis.172
165. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 58, at 2, 4 (finding that export-credit agencies, 
which often provide project funding, “maintain control, or ‘golden vetoes,’ over common cov-
enants and inter-creditor matters,” but “are willing to allow [project] bonds into a capital 
structure and treat bondholders much as they do commercial lenders”).
166. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural Address for the Inau-
gural Symposium of the Review of Banking & Financial Law, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 619, 
627–28 (2012).
167. See Barr, supra note 146, at 1144–56; Xiangsheng Dou & Jing Wang, Asset Securiti-
zation and Bubbles: An Illustration of Subprime Mortgage Default Crisis, 2 Advances Econ. &
Bus. 112, 114–17 (2014).
168. Broadly speaking, securitization, applicable to any type of financial assets, is the
process of pooling and selling rights to payment and other financial assets in order to 
better allocate risks to parties able to understand and bear them, increase the amount 
and reduce the cost of funding available for consumers and businesses, facilitate special-
ization of functions, leverage economies of scale, and, in the case of securitizing the fi-
nancial assets of a bank or other regulated financial institution, remove risks from the 
balance sheet of those institutions.
Barr, supra note 146, at 1137–38.
169. Id. at 1141.
170. Lowell L. Bryan, Structured Securitized Credit: A Superior Technology for Lending, J. 
Applied Corp. Fin., Fall 1988, at 6, 14–16 (explaining the benefits such as economies of scale 
to investors, issuing institutions, investment banks, guarantors of credit risk, and borrowers).
171. Barr, supra note 146, at 1138–39.
172. See Leigland & Russell, supra note 10, at 1.
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Only in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis did regulators fully under-
stand the systemic risk implications of securitization: the tremendous com-
plexity and interconnectedness it added to the markets. Fraudulent conduct 
and systemic risk eluded detection, even by several different layers of special-
ized gatekeepers.173 The mortgage securitization process weakened each 
gatekeeper’s incentive to conduct thorough examinations of underlying risks 
and led to overreliance on each of the market participants, such as the credit 
rating agencies.174 As a result, overall asset quality and credit rating stand-
ards decreased.175 Subprime mortgage loans flooded the securitization mar-
ket, though markets remained optimistic.176 The U.S. housing market heavily 
relied on the short-term funding markets that used complicated financial 
structures, such as asset-backed commercial paper conduits.177 Financial in-
stitutions purchased over-the-counter derivatives, falsely believing that they 
had “reduced their exposure to the mortgage markets or other large 
firms.”178 Unfortunately, similar trends are beginning to emerge in project 
finance. 
Drawing comparisons between the rise of securitization and recent 
trends in project finance is somewhat simplistic,179 but there are notable sim-
ilarities between the two. Unlike project bank lending, project bond financ-
ing often involves an underwriter who assesses project risks and distributes 
bonds to the debt capital markets.180 Institutional investors, many of whom 
are not themselves experts in project finance, often rely on other gatekeep-
173. Cf. Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1583, 1589–1604 (2010) 
(challenging the conception of the “unitary gatekeeper,” or the perception that all gatekeepers 
act in unison, and discussing the disadvantages of having multiple gatekeepers in business 
transactions).
174. See Barr, supra note 146, at 1144–56 (finding that the fragmentation of functions 
and the “originate-to-distribute” model in the context of securitization has contributed misa-
lignment of market incentives and heavy reliance on rating agencies, and overall increase in 
market risks); cf. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transi-
tion from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, 624 (1998) (finding that fragmentation of 
property rights may have adverse economic consequences, such as underuse or waste of scarce 
resources).
175. See Barr, supra note 146, at 1144–56.
176. FCIC Report, supra note 5, at 70 (“In 2006, $600 billion of subprime loans were 
originated, most of which were securitized. That year, subprime lending accounted for 23.5% 
of all mortgage originations.”)
177. See Barr, supra note 146, at 1234–37.
178. Id. at 1074–75.
179. For example, project bonds currently do not operate under the “originate-to-
distribute” model, where lenders make loans with the intent not to hold but to sell them to in-
vestors. Many argue that this model led to excessive competition in the mortgage loan securiti-
zation market and a downward spiral in underwriting standards. See generally Michael Sim-
kovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 Ind. L.J. 213, 222–25 (2013).
180. See Siebens & Gasperow, supra note 15, at 254–55.
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ers—such as lawyers and accountants—to further assess project risks.181 Im-
portantly, obtaining credit ratings by the same agencies involved in the secu-
ritization market is “certainly a prerequisite to reach a broader base of [pro-
ject] bond investors.”182 Meanwhile, banks continue to originate and dis-
distribute project loans to institutional investors.183
Much like the securitization market before the Financial Crisis, project 
finance is becoming more decentralized and functionally fragmented. Most 
institutional investors do not have the one-stop-shop capabilities or man-
agement incentives that banks have.184 The prominence of institutional in-
vestors is thus giving rise to new players with specialized functions, such as 
monitoring advisers, in project finance. Monitoring advisers are mostly for-
mer employees of monoline insurance companies, but they do not take on 
any credit risk in individual projects.185 Instead, they provide broad adminis-
trative and managerial services, such as approving project budgets and met-
rics and assumptions in financial models for institutional investors.186 Due to 
their lack of project expertise and incentives to monitor, institutional inves-
tors are thus giving rise to specialized industries and heavily relying on them 
to perform significant functions.
Like the rise of securitization before the Financial Crisis, specialization 
and decentralization of project finance through increased institutional activi-
ty likely introduce additional complexity and interconnectedness into the 
global financial system. The markets are already observing the dilution of 
project-governance standards.187 In times of prolonged credit expansion and 
market optimism, credit rating standards and project asset quality will likely 
decline.188 To accommodate increased demands for risky debt instruments,
financial markets tend to engineer new investment vehicles and complex de-
rivatives.189 Meanwhile, gatekeepers could fail to perform their assigned 
181. See id. at 265–66 (discussing auditor’s role in issuing comfort letters and lawyer’s
role in issuing legal opinions); Dunning, supra note 60; Latham & Watkins Client Alert,
supra note 15, at 3–4.
182. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Infrastructure Financing Instru-
ments and Incentives 26 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/financing-for-investment/
Infrastructure-Financing-Instruments-and-Incentives.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT5U-2WG7]; 
see also Plenderleith, supra note 85, at para. 3.31 (“The depth of the market for a project bond 
issuance depends in large part on the credit rating given to that issuance.”).
183. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Section II.B.
185. Carter, supra note 60.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
188. Cf. FCIC Report, supra note 5, at 84–91 (describing the credit expansion and pro-
liferation of subprime mortgage loans).
189. See id. at 45–51.
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functions, and underwriters and project bond issuers could rely too heavily 
on credit rating agencies.190
Thus, the continued expansion of institutional activity in project finance 
may have global systemic risk implications. The migration of lending activity 
shifts financial risks into various institutional investors, undermining exist-
ing regulations implemented to make the markets safer.191 Further, institu-
tional investors render the project finance market even more complex and 
interconnected. By resuscitating certain risky financial industries and caus-
ing decentralization and specialization of function in project finance, institu-
tional investors will likely make the global financial system riskier. Admit-
tedly, this Comment is somewhat speculative, and it relies on several 
assumptions. For instance, the project finance industry on its own might not 
be sufficiently large to trigger the next global financial crisis, and institution-
al investors could play an insignificant role in this market in the future.192
But project finance is a microcosm of other financial markets; institutional 
investors are on the rise in other sectors as well.193 Project finance is grow-
ing,194 and institutional investors are playing a larger role in the market.195
There does not appear to be a silver bullet. One solution would be to 
limit the mechanisms for, or the advantages of, migration of risk into various 
institutional investors.196 This could mean introducing a leverage ratio and 
liquidity requirement for certain institutional investors or, counterintuitive-
ly, deregulating the traditional banking sector.197 Another solution is to im-
pose regulatory requirements on certain complex financial instruments used 
in project finance to make them less attractive.198 And regulators may 
190. Cf. Barr, supra note 146, at 1144–48 (finding that specialization of function and 
resulted in overreliance on gatekeepers and credit rating agencies).
191. See supra Section III.A.
192. In addition, in the Latin American market, while the project “bond market for infra-
structure projects is maturing,” this market covered only “14.5% of [total] project costs in the 
first half of 2017.” Baini, supra note 114.
193. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionaliza-
tion of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1026 (2009) (discussing the rise of institu-
tional investors in the securities markets).
194. See League Tables 2015, supra note 12, at 48.
195. See supra Section I.B.
196. See Schwarcz, supra note 166, at 638 (“Therefore, if there is a regulatory solution, it 
lies with limiting regulatory arbitrage, the other factor giving rise to shadow banking.”).
197. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 166, at 638 (suggesting that migration of financial risks 
from traditional banks into shadow banks could be limited by “regulating traditional banks 
less”); Schwarcz, supra note 132, at 239–41 (finding that leverage and liquidity requirements 
for certain institutional investors may significantly decrease systemic risk at the expense of in-
curring economic efficiency costs).
198. Cf. Judge, supra note 97, at 476 (lending “support for regulations that make it costli-
er for market participants to create relatively more complex instruments and other reforms 
targeting complexity” as a way to mitigate the systemic risk in the shadow banking system).
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strengthen disclosure requirements governing project participants and gate-
keepers.199
Conclusion
Whether the rise of institutional investors in project finance will lead to 
the next financial calamity is difficult to predict. But the history of financial 
crises tends to repeat itself,200 especially if regulators and the financial mar-
kets fail to stay vigilant. The Basel III rules and other global credit enhance-
ment initiatives have animated institutional activity in project finance. Ulti-
mately, public responses to the Financial Crisis produced the unintended 
consequences of heightening project-level risks and pumping seemingly reg-
ulated risks back into the global financial system.
Regulators and policymakers can craft sound regulations to mitigate the 
effects of financial crises. Public policies must be thoughtfully devised, cog-
nizant of the potential for unintended consequences. It is true that institu-
tional investors play an important role in project finance and the broader 
markets. Thus, any regulatory effort in the area must necessarily balance the 
need to mitigate project-level and systemic risk, while preserving the effi-
ciency of institutional investors in project finance.
It is incumbent on scholars and financial regulators to learn more about 
the risks associated with increased institutional activity in project finance. 
We must closely examine the underlying risks of project finance to deter-
mine whether congressional action is necessary or existing laws give finan-
cial regulators appropriate authority to regulate institutional investors.201 We
must find ways to craft targeted regulation to keep the project finance mar-
ket efficient while mitigating project-level and systemic risk. Most im-
portantly, we must continue to study the financial markets so that we do not 
forget so easily.
199. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Cri-
sis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313, 351 (2014) (identifying “in-
creased mandatory disclosure” as the “simplest response to market failure that turns on infor-
mation costs” in the shadow banking system).
200. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 211, 248–49 (2009) (contending that “failures are almost inevitable in complex systems,”
including the financial markets).
201. Cf. Note, Danger Lurking in the Shadows: Why Regulators Lack the Authority to Ef-
fectively Fight Contagion in the Shadow Banking System, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 729, 737–39 (2013) 
(suggesting that financial regulators lack the authority to regulate certain nonbank financial 
industries).
